Fingers are pointing fast and furious as wayward classified documents surface. But finger-pointing and blame won’t fix the root causes of the problem—or even begin to identify its true extent.
Maybe there isn’t a widespread problem? Maybe the people whose premises were searched happen to be the only three people to have retained classified documents? Even if theoretically possible, that seems unlikely.
More likely: if the three most recent Presidents and/or Vice Presidents retained classified documents, there are probably more people with more documents out there. It’s quite possible that other former Presidents and Vice Presidents inadvertently retained materials, because there are clearly holes in the system of ensuring classified documents stay where they are supposed to stay. The canaries we’ve identified are symptoms but probably not limits of the problem.
Branch by Branch
Also, it would be a mistake to limit this hypothesis to the executive branch. We don’t know the extent of the problem. Could it extend to White House staff, congressional representatives, agency employees, and judicial branch personnel?
We won’t know unless the government looks thoroughly and widely, with the cooperation of all potentially involved personnel. But right now, incentives tend to favor individuals not looking for these documents, since finding them brings bad PR and possible liability. (Also, it feels like heresy but must be said: kudos to former Vice President Pence for stepping up, looking for the documents, and highlighting the potentially broad nature of this problem.)
So, let’s talk about how to fix the system instead of sending truth underground with punitive measures targeted toward those who’ve already surrendered documents. There’s an opportunity for real change and improvement here.
An IRS-Style Amnesty?
Yet more heresy: the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) might offer a good model for identifying and correcting a potentially widespread problem of uncertain magnitude. That’s because when the IRS suspected taxpayers had not reported all of their foreign bank accounts, they established amnesty programs. Amnesty programs, as the name implies, offer forgiveness (ideally without penalties) for people who come forward voluntarily to correct their own misreporting.
With a little ingenuity, this approach could work for classified-gate as well.
Here’s how it could look:
The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and other agencies of the U.S. government declare an amnesty period for former executive, legislative, and judicial branch officers, representatives, and employees.
Everyone uses the amnesty period to rummage through their files and archives, thoroughly look for classified material, and report it to NARA or the appropriate agency if they find anything.
NARA or the appropriate agency sends representatives to pick up the classified material, understand how it fell through the cracks, and return it to the proper place, waiving penalties for those who reported to them.
In parallel, NARA and agencies convene to identify root causes for the holes they find in the classified document oversight system.1
Once root causes are identified, the system is changed to address them, so the problem will not recur.
Changes made are tested over time to ensure they are effective.
The amnesty period expires and everyone moves forward with a better approach.
The Choice at Hand
So, does the U.S. government have the will to face the truth head-on and fix the system, or will they settle for a whack-a-mole approach that solves little and ultimately perpetuates what appears to be a pretty big problem?
Punitive measures taken now could incentivize silence and denial from others who might find themselves in a similar situation—especially those with less power who might not be current or former heads or deputy heads of state.
On the other hand, an amnesty approach designed to identify and remediate root causes could improve safeguards over classified information for the foreseeable future.
It’s clear which option is right. It’s not yet clear which option the government will choose.
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Extra, Extra!
Three links from the depths of my bookmark archives; think of these as tangential extras for curious readers:
1. History of Classification and Declassification - by the Federation of American Scientists - to reform a system, understand its history.
2. The U.S. has an overclassification problem, says one former special counsel - by Kai McNamee, Ailsa Chang, and Ashley Brown in NPR - with millions of documents classified every year, it’s a hard system to manage.
As just one example, does so much stuff need to be classified in the first place? Classification should be reserved for information that truly merits it, which might in turn allow it to be handled more restrictively.
Well said. The overuse of classification brings to mind a funny comment that was made post 9/11. There was some distress about the paranoia of the search and the breadth of document and signal analysis. Some high up in the FBI I think said something like. "Post 9/11 our job has become to find a needle in the haystack. Meanwhile all we are doing is making more hay."